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Abstract
The objective of the paper is to analyze the risk management behavior of a non-industrial
private forest owner under uncertainty about timber production. Two types of hedging strategies
with harvesting decisions are studied: a financial practice versus a physical one. We develop a
two-period model of hedging and harvesting decisions when the forest owner values the amenity
services of forest. We study the properties of optimal current and future harvesting and hedg-
ing decisions. We show that, except when both hedging instruments are perfect substitutes,
the forest owner chooses a single tool, her/his choice depending on the rate of return of the
hedging instrument. We also prove that the greater the marginal utility of amenity services,
the smaller the harvesting amount. We provide a comparative statics analysis on current and
future harvesting and on the hedging strategies. We are interested in the impact of an increase
in initial stocks (wealth and timber), timber prices (periods 1 and 2), opportunity costs of the
hedging instruments (rate of return for savings and cost of the regeneration process for physical
practice) and expected risk. We show, for example, that an increase in expected risk has a
negative impact on period 1 harvesting and the use of hedging tools for both strategies, while
the impact on period 2 harvesting is positive for savings and null for physical practice.
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1 Introduction
In many countries of Europe, forests are managed by small Non-Industrial Private Forest (NIPF)
owners with some specific characteristics that have an impact on forest management. Two main
characteristics of NIPF owners can be highlighted. The first one is that the main objective of NIPF
owners is to smooth consumption over time. They therefore face a saving-consumption problem
linked with forest management. The second one is that NIPF owners have positive utility due to
amenity functions of forests along with the revenue from timber sales. Recently it has been proved
that NIPF owners confer some private value on the amenity services of forest stock, even if there are
no financial incentives to these functions (Birch, [1] ; Butler and Leatherberry, [2]). Forests provide
a large variety of non-timber services, such as walking, landscape and mushroom crops, produced
jointly with timber and vanishing with the standing stock. The saving-consumption problem and
joint production property affect the way NIPF owners manage their forest.
Furthermore NIPF owners face natural risk that affects these two main characteristics (con-
sumption smoothing and amenity services). For several years, the frequency and severity of extreme
climatic events have seemed to increase and they have caused more and more damage in forestry
management (Schelhaas et al., [3]). Natural disasters affect the timber production of forests, but
also the amenity services to be got from standing stock. Amenities therefore reinforce the interest
of protection and hedging measures against such risk. In spite of the presence of market insurance,1
NIPF owners generally give preference to access to perfect financial markets and different forest
management practices to smooth consumption across different states of nature due to risk. Recent
exceptional natural events in Europe have focused attention on programs to give NIPF owners in-
centives to reduce the risk of damage from natural events.2 Therefore, before analyzing different
policy instruments, it is very important to understand the hedging behavior of NIPF owners.
Regarding the technology of risk exchange and the design of hedging practices, our paper mainly
focuses on the use of financial markets (savings decisions) and forest management practices (close
to self-insurance decisions). Note that from a conceptual point of view, each of these instruments
plays a specific role in the technology of risk exchange. On the one hand, financial markets allow
the reallocation of resources across different dates in order to smooth consumption inter-temporally,
possibly providing coverage against future risks (i.e. precautionary savings); thus, the use of finan-
cial markets is a matter of inter-temporal tradeoff. On the other hand, forest management practices
are a means by which NIPF owners reallocate resources across the different states of nature and re-
1It is observed in Europe that forest insurance is an unusual practice among NIPF owners to protect their forests
against natural disturbances (Brunette and Couture [4]).
2See for example CEC [5] and FAO [6] for the prevention against storm in Europe.
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duce their exposure to natural risks (i.e. mitigate their consequences on the rate of forest growth);
thus, self-insurance decisions such as forest management practices are a matter of risk tradeoff.
This gives rise to many questions. First, how do hedging strategies affect the allocation of forests
to harvesting and amenity service purposes? Second, should NIPF owners use both practices simul-
taneously? Third, are these differences in harvesting and consumption-savings behavior dependent
on the hedging strategies selected by the forest owner? Fourth, what are the qualitative properties
of timber supply and hedging strategies when amenity services have private value? In this paper,
we provide some answers to these questions.
These issues of forest management can be analyzed in three types of modeling framework: the
basic rotation model,3 the Wicksellian single rotation model4 and the two-period biomass harvest-
ing model.5 The two-period model represents the NIPF owner’s short-run decision problem, and
explicitly deals with short-run timber supply rather than some state variable, such as stand age in
the rotation model. This model allows for the short-run fluctuations in exogenous variables such
as stumpage prices, unlike the optimal rotation model. Such variations considerably affect the for-
est owner’s decisions. It addresses the main silvicultural practices of forest management and can
be taken to represent both thinning, uneven-aged management and even-aged management with
clear-cutting. It allows for risk-management decisions, consumption-savings decisions, and their
implications on timber supply. The two-period model of consumption and savings offers a natural
way of incorporating uncertainty and risk preferences using the expected utility framework. It also
facilitates the analysis of interaction between non-timber benefits and timber ones, and implications
in optimal decisions. For our purpose, the two-period model is preferred to the optimal rotation
model as a more analytically suitable framework. While the effect of risk on timber supply has
been studied in previous works using the two-period model (Koskela and Ollikainen [18] and [19]),
the joint problems of smoothing consumption over time and managing a forest that simultaneously
produces timber and amenities under risk have been relatively little analyzed. In the two-period
3The basic rotation model represents a positive description of forest owner behavior and determines a static long-
run equilibrium. Empirical observations are never able to tract changes in the equilibrium harvesting levels predicted
by the rotation model. It is not possible to test the theoretical predictions against empirical evidence. The reliability
of policy recommendations based on the theoretical rotation framework is greatly reduced.
4Alvarez and Koskela [7], [8] and [9] have used the Wicksellian single rotation model to analyze the impact of
inter-temporally fluctuating and stochastic mean-reverting interest rate processes on the optimal harvesting threshold
and the expected length of rotation period when forest stand has been assumed to be stochastic, and landowners are
risk neutral [7] and [8] or risk averse [9].
5Lohmander [10] introduces a Fisherian consumption-savings model of a forest owner assumed to maximize her/his
utility of consumption over two periods. This last model (Koskela [11]; Kuuluvainen [12]; Ovaskainen [13]) has been
widely used as the theoretical framework in the analysis of timber supply from NIPF owners. This model is known as
the basic two-period model of timber supply analysis (see also Binkley [14]; Johansson and Löfgren [15]). It has been
extended to include owner consumption decisions, market imperfections, non-market amenities (Kuuluvainen [12]
and [16]; Kuuluvainen and Salo [17]) and taxation (Koskela [11]; Ovaskainen [13]), and risk (Koskela and Ollikainen
[18] and [19]).
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model, Koskela and Ollikainen [18] and [19] analyzed how optimal current and future harvests are
affected by risk. They did not deal, however, with the issue of hedging against forest risk, or the
issue of consumption smoothing. To our knowledge, hedging measures against natural risks have
been studied within a Faustmann rotation framework by Reed [20] and Amacher et al. [21] but not
in a two-period biomass harvesting model.
This is our concern in this paper. We investigate decision making of NIPF owners in terms of
hedging against natural hazards, and we provide a comparative analysis of the alternative advantages
produced by two different hedging measures: a financial method (savings) versus a physical one
(regeneration process). We explore harvesting and hedging behavior of forest owners when they
value amenity services of forests, and when there is uncertainty about biological timber. The
natural hazard is represented by a multiplicative risk bearing on forest growth. We show that,
except when both hedging instruments are perfect substitutes, the forest owner chooses a single
tool, with her/his choice depending on the rate of return of the hedging instrument. We also prove
that the greater the marginal utility of amenity services, the smaller the harvesting amount. The
comparative statics of current and future harvesting are developed. We show that an increase in
the current (future) timber price induces a rise in first (second)-period harvesting and a decrease in
second (first)-period harvesting.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model of timber supply
when NIPF owners value the amenity services of forest stands, when there is uncertainty about
production and when the owners can take hedging measures in order to protect their forest stands
against natural risks. Two hedging tools are studied jointly. Section 3 explores properties of interior
solutions and the results from comparative statics. Section 4 analyzes corner solutions and some
extensions of the initial theoretical model. The first extension concerns the concavity of utility due
to amenity functions in order to deal with the congestion problem. The second extension is about
the timing of uncertainty because the final revenue of the NIPF owner depends on the realization
date of such risk. Finally, Section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
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2 The model with financial and forest management practices
2.1 Assumptions and timing of the model
We consider a NIPF owner who makes decisions about consumption flows6 for two periods (periods
1 and 2 hereafter). The NIPF owner is endowed with exogenous initial wealth Y1 in period 1 and
Y2 in period 2, and an even-aged forest corresponding to an initial stock Q.
The timing of decisions and the description of uncertainty, named Delayed resolution of uncer-
tainty, are represented in Figure 1, and are described as follows.
Figure 1: Timing of Decisions and Delayed resolution of uncertainty
At the beginning of period 1, the NIPF owner decides how much to harvest in the first and
second periods (denoted respectively as x1, x2). She/he obtains timber prices denoted as p1 and p2,
respectively. Both prices are known at the beginning of period 1, and do not depend on the timber
volume supplied by the owner. We consider that the NIPF owner is a price taker.7 We also assume
that there is a future timber price market which is not affected by risk occurrence.8 She/he also
considers two decisions corresponding to hedging strategies. The first decision concerns financial
practice, whereas the second one is about forest management practice. The financial practice is a
process of savings accumulation in which the forest owner can operate on a perfect capital market
and is allowed to save with no limit at a certain interest rate - we will denote as R > 1 the gross
interest rate on the capital market. The forest management practice consists, for the forest owner,
6We assume that NIPF owners use harvesting as the decision variable. An alternative decision variable which
could be used is forest stock. If NIPF owners decide upon harvesting, then consumption that depends on the revenue
of forest harvest is certain whereas forest stocks will be stochastic. If they decide upon forest stocks, then the revenues
of harvesting will become stochastic, and thereby consumption also. As the main objective of NIPF owners is to
smooth revenue, and thereby consumption over time, it seems more realistic to consider harvesting as the decision
variable.
7For small NIPF owners, stumpage prices do not depend on the volume harvested.
8Koskela and Ollikainen [18] considered that there was uncertainty about future timber price but not about future
timber stock.
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in regenerating part of the forest in the first period. This regenerated part of the forest procures
an outcome only in period 2 - the implicit assumption is that the young plantations produce no
financial and no ecological values as long as they have not yet reached a sufficient size, which only
occurs in the second period. The stock of regenerated trees is not affected by the occurrence of
natural disaster events, such that the value of the regenerated forest stock in the second period does
not depend on the realization of the random variable. Such a physical practice can be seen as a
precautionary means of protecting the forest against natural risks. Investment in the regeneration
process is represented through a constitution cost in period 1, denoted c(q) where c(q) = c.q and
c > 0, and q represents the stock of regenerated trees chosen by the forest owner.
At the time the NIPF owner takes her/his decisions, she/he observes the present and future
values for harvesting prices at each date and the various technological parameters, except for the
value of the forest stand at the beginning of period 2. This is because, during an interim period,
the final first period forest stock k1 (i.e. after the realization of the first-period harvesting) evolves
according to a process described through the function g(k1) satisfying: g(0) = 0, and for any k1 > 0 :
g′ > 1 and g′′ < 0. However, the final outcome of this (natural) process depends on the realization
of a random variable, reflecting the influence of some natural risks (biological or climatic) affecting
the value of the forest stock at the beginning of period 2 and before the implementation of the
harvesting decision for period 2.
Uncertainty is described through the random variable θ, and the value of θ is resolved at the
end of the growth process. In other words, θ is revealed and observed by the forest owner only at
the beginning of period 2, but without having the opportunity beforehand to make her/his second
period harvesting decision, such that the value of the stands at the end of the growth process and
before that harvesting takes place is θg(k1). The possible realizations for θ are described according
to a probability distribution which is supposed to be known by the forest owner at the beginning
of period 1, and represented by a cumulative function denoted F (θ) defined on
[
θ, θ¯
] ⊂ [0, 1] and
with a density f(θ) > 0 everywhere. Remark that we may choose θ as close as possible to 0, which
may be seen as the realization of a catastrophic event implying that the forest is fully destroyed.
In this case, any harvesting decision x2 > 0 set in period 1 appears not to be feasible. In contrast,
as θ → 1, the event corresponds to the best outcome for the NIPF owner, when no natural risk
damages the forest property. However, the paper does not elaborate on the issue of contingent plans
for harvesting in period 2 - we will consider only the situation where the forest owner voluntarily
makes dynamically consistent choices.
The forest owner’s preferences are defined, on the one hand, on the basis of her/his present and
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past consumption, denoted as c1 and c2 respectively, and on the other hand, of present and future
amenity services provided by forest stands, denoted as k1 and k2, respectively.9 For the sake of
simplicity, we will assume that such preferences have a representation which is additively separable
both between periods, and between consumption and amenity services at each date, such that for a
given inter-temporal flow of consumption and forest stands (c1,c2, k1, k2) the associated utility level
V is defined by:
V = u(c1) + v(k1) + δ [u(c2) + v(k2)] (1)
where δ ∈]0, 1[ is the discounting factor, u is the temporal utility function for consumption, and
v is the temporal utility function for amenity services. We will assume that u is increasing and
concave (u′ > 0, u′′ < 0), while v satisfies v′ = m =constant> 0. This last assumption10 seems
of specific concern here, since we introduce only pure individual amenities, and not collective ones:
the forest owner has the opportunity to enjoy the existence of amenity services provided by the
forest, without incurring a congestion externality effect as in the case of collective use of forest.
For example, when the owner contemplates a beautiful landscape, her/his marginal utility from
amenities is constant. However, if ten persons arrive, block owner’s view and make some noise,
then the constant marginal utility hypothesis does not hold. Consequently, this assumption can be
justified for amenity services for which congestion is not a relevant issue. This could apply to scenic
beauty or recreation.
When the forest owner has the opportunity to accumulate savings and, at the same time, to
invest in the regeneration process, the forest owner’s inter-temporal consumption decisions must
respect two basic temporal budget constraints:
c1 ≡ Y1 + pi(x1)− s− c.q with pi(x1) ≡ p1x1 − h(x1) (2)
c2 ≡ Y2 +R.s+ pi(x2) with pi(x2) ≡ p2x2 − h(x2) (3)
where pi(xi) for i = 1, 2 denotes the net benefit from the harvesting in period i, which is defined
as usual as the difference between harvesting revenue pixi and harvesting cost h(xi) corresponding
to the various expenditure borne by the landowner during the harvesting process; we will assume
that h(xi) = hxi with h > 0. Note that (2) and (3) concern the forest owner’s consumption and
savings decisions. In the first period, consumption (c1) is defined by the sum of initial wealth (Y1)
9We introduce the traditional assumption in which non-timber services are a function of the standing stock volume
(Max and Lehman [22]).
10Koskela and Ollikainen [18] also considered constant marginal utility in terms of amenity services.
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and the net revenue from harvesting minus savings (s) and regeneration cost cq. During the first
period, the forest owner allocates the total revenue between current consumption, savings and risk
forest-management cost. In the second period, consumption (c2) is represented by the sum of initial
wealth (Y2) and net revenue from harvesting and earnings on savings (Rs).
The joint production of timber and amenities is defined by the two following relationships, and
the associated feasibility constraints:
k1 ≡ Q− x1, with 0 ≤ x1 ≤ Q (4)
k2(θ) ≡ θg(Q− x1)− x2 + q, with 0 ≤ x2 ≤ θ.g(Q− x1) + q (5)
According to (4), the value of the stand at the end of period 1 and before the beginning of the
interim period, is the difference between initial forest stock Q and the first-period harvesting x1.
Thus, it may be useful to consider some natural restrictions such as 0 ≤ x1 ≤ Q which introduce
some obvious limits into the first harvesting decision: the landowner may prefer not to harvest at
all in the first period, or on the contrary to harvest all the available timber; both restrictions imply,
given the forest owner’s intrinsic preferences for amenity services, that: k1 ≥ 0. According to (5)
now,11 the value of the forest stands at the end of period 2 is the difference between the value of
the available stands after the realization of θ, and the second-period harvesting. We also have to
consider some natural restrictions: the landowner may prefer not to harvest for the second period:
thus 0 ≤ x2. However, to the extent that the harvesting decision for period 2 is made at the beginning
of period 1 - and thus, without knowing the realized value of θ - the landowner may experience
some trouble in period 2 when confronted with a decision that cannot be implemented. This occurs
when/because the owner decided ex ante for a high level of x2, but unfortunately it appears as
non-feasible ex post given a low realization of θ for example: i.e. θg(Q − x1) < x2 ⇒ k2(θ) < 0.
In order to overcome the difficulties arising from the occurrence of such dynamically inconsistent
decisions, it is natural to assume that the NIPF owner considers the worst state of nature and adopts
a disciplined approach (precautious, reasonable, or self-restrained behavior), such as not harvesting
for more than the surviving stands after the lowest value of θ is realized. Such discipline implies,
for example, that k2(θ) ≥ 0 for any θ - and when the constraint binds (the owner decides in period
11The literature usually assumes that k2 = k1 + h(k1)− x2 = k1
(
1 + h(k1)
k1
)
− x2 where h(.) is an increasing and
concave function (see Koskela and Ollikainen [18] and [19]; Ovaskainen et al. [23]), such that h(k1)
k1
corresponds to
the net forest growth rate. Remark that both specifications are equivalent to the extent that g(k1)
k1
= 1 + h(k1)
k1
corresponds to the gross forest growth rate. Our formulation simply allows more tractable expressions for the first
order conditions.
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1 on the highest possible harvesting in period 2) then k2(θ) = 0 but k2(θ) > 0 for any θ > θ.
2.2 Optimal rules of financial and physical practices
One of the main purposes of the paper is to analyze two different strategies allowing the management
of forest risks, when these risks are the sole source of uncertainty. In other words, both instruments
are designed to fulfill the same objective in the economy, and both have perfectly foreseen outcomes
in the second period. In particular, they have a deterministic influence in the sense that their use
entails no additional source of uncertainty for the NIPF owner: the interest rate and the cost of
physical practice are known with certainty. As a result, the landowner can use two instruments
which are close substitutes, differing only in terms of return/cost conditions. The issue is thus:
Should the forest owner use both instruments? We show that generally this is not the case.
Formally, the NIPF owner makes four decisions at the beginning of period 1 (x1, x2, s, q) in order
to maximize the expectation of (1) under constraints (2) to (5). The decision program of the forest
owner is the following, which explicitly deals with the non-negativity constraints on q and s:
P1

Max{x1,x2,s,q} u(c1) +mk1 + δ [u(c2) +mE(k2(θ))]
s/t
c1 = Y1 + pi(x1)− s− c(q) with pi(x1) ≡ p1x1 − h(x1)
c2 = Y2 +R.s+ pi(x2) with pi(x2) ≡ p2x2 − h(x2)
k1 = Q− x1, with 0 ≤ x1 ≤ Q
k2(θ) = θg(Q− x1)− x2 + q, with 0 ≤ x2 ≤ θ.g(Q− x1) + q
q ≥ 0
s ≥ 0
Given the high number of associated constraints which may potentially be involved, we will
introduce some simplifications in order to focus on the main issues of the model. To begin with,
we may easily deal with, and thus neglect the non-negativity constraints on x1 and x2 (i.e. we
will assume that 0 < x1 and 0 < x2). Intuitively, this requires p1 and p2 to be large enough.
For example it can be verified that p1 > h + mu′(Y1)(1 + E(θ).g
′(Q)) ⇒ dEVdx1 |x1=s=q=0 > 0 and
p2 > h + mu′(Y2) ⇒ dEVdx2 |x2=s=0 > 0, justifying that at least some harvesting is undertaken at each
date. Note that this also implies that pi − h > 0 is not enough to have xi > 0 for all i = 1, 2: p1
and p2 must be sufficiently greater than the marginal cost h. We will consider that such conditions
hold in the rest of the paper.
This allows us to focus on the issue of the optimal mix (q, s) under the feasibility constraints on
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harvesting in both periods. Let us introduce four Lagrange multipliers: µ, λ, γ, σ, such that:
• µ = 0 if s > 0 and otherwise µ ≥ 0;
• λ = 0 if q > 0 and otherwise λ ≥ 0;
• σ = 0 if x1 < Q and otherwise σ ≥ 0;
• γ = 0 if x2 < θg(Q− x1) + q and otherwise γ ≥ 0.
The first order conditions defining the solutions for (P1) are the following ones:12
pi′1u
′
1 −m(1 + δg′.E(θ))− σ − δγθg′ = 0 (6)
δ(pi′2u
′
2 −m)− γ = 0 (7)
−u′1 + δRu′2 + µ = 0 (8)
−cu′1 + (δm+ γ) + λ = 0 (9)
where pi′i = pi
′
i(xi) = pi − h for i = 1, 2. For an analysis of the second order conditions,
see Appendix A; these are met under the concavity restriction introduced on functions u and g.
Remark that (6) is written as pi′1u′1 = m(1 + δg′.E(θ)) + σ + δγθg′; given that the RHS term in
the equality is positive, this implies that pi′1 = p1 − h > 0. By a similar argument, note that (7)
is also written as δpi′2u′2 = δm + γ which yields pi′2 = p2 − h > 0. Note that these restrictions are
obviously satisfied once we introduce the (necessary) conditions that both prices are high enough
as seen before.
The central result regarding the optimal use of savings and silvicultural practices is afforded by
the Proposition 1:
Proposition 1 All else held equal:
i) If R > p2−hc then the solution is such that s
∗ > 0 and q∗ = 0.
ii) If R < p2−hc then the solution is such that q
∗ > 0 and s∗ = 0.
iii) If R = p2−hc then the optimal mix of q
∗ > 0 and s∗ > 0 is undetermined.
12To clarify the presentation of these conditions, we simplify the writing of the functions by not clarifying the
variables which compose them.
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Proof. Mixing (7) and (8) leads to: u′1 =
R
pi′2
(δm + γ) + µ, while equation (9) yields: u′1 =
1
c
(
δm + γ
)
+ λc . Mixing both relationships and using (7) gives: δu
′
2
(
R − pi′2c
)
m = λc − µ, implying
that any solution is such that:
sign
(
R− pi
′
2
c
)
= sign
(λ
c
− µ
)
Consequently, there are three possibilities:
1/ if R − pi′2c < 0 then λc < µ and it is impossible that s > 0. Indeed, s > 0 implies µ = 0 and
this requires that λ < 0, which is a contradiction. λ could be equal to zero but then, equations (7)
and (8) bring a new contradiction R = pi
′
2
c . Thus, the sole solution is s = 0 and q > 0.
2/ if R − pi′2c > 0 then λc > µ and it is impossible that q > 0. Indeed, q > 0 implies λ = 0 and
this requires that µ < 0, which is a contradiction. Consequently, the only solution is s > 0 and
q = 0.
3/ if R − pi′2c = 0 then λc = µ and this requires that, either s = 0 and q = 0 (but we ignore
such a corner solution), or s > 0 and q > 0. But, intuitively, when s > 0 and q > 0, q and
s are redundant because (8) and (9) with R = pi
′
2
c and µ =
λ
c = 0 give the following condition:
δRu′2 = δ
1
cm⇒ pi′2u′2 = m which means that one of the conditions (7), (8) or (9) is redundant.
The results of Proposition 1 mean that, under our technological assumptions (i.e. constant
marginal costs for both harvesting and silvicultural practice), the landowner uses the financial
practice if it represents the best return/cost condition compared to the silvicultural one
(
namely:
R >
pi′2
c
)
, or she/he only uses silvicultural practice in the opposite case
(
when: R < pi
′
2
c
)
. But
if R = pi
′
2
c , the forest owner is facing two perfectly substitutable instruments in relation to which
she/he is indifferent; in this case, she/he may use only one of the instruments, or any mix of both.
This allows us, in the next paragraph, to focus on situations where the landowner only chooses a
single practice, and we analyze the general properties of harvesting decisions.
2.3 Optimal harvesting decisions : pure interior solutions
Here, we concentrate on the interior solutions for optimal harvesting decisions in the first and second
periods. Note that whatever the specification of the model, the second-period harvesting rule is
restricted in order to maintain dynamically consistent decisions. The NIPF owner is assumed not
to harvest more than the surviving stands after the lowest value of θ is realized. We forward to
the last section of the paper the analysis of the solution where the feasibility constraint on second
period harvesting binds.
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2.3.1 Harvesting decisions in the savings model
First, let us assume that the financial practice has a higher return/cost ratio than the silvicultural
one
(
i.e. R − pi′2c > 0
)
. Therefore the landowner only uses savings to reallocate resources between
the two periods. Formally, the decision program of the forest owner is described by (P1) with q = 0,
and will be termed the “savings model" in the rest of the paper.
In this case, let us denote the optimal choice as (x∗1, x∗2, s∗)13. Using conditions (6), (7) and (8),
the first order conditions for a (interior) solution with s > 0, x1 > 0 and x2 < θ.g(Q−x1) are given
simply by the next three equations (since µ = σ = γ = 0 and condition (9) is irrelevant in the sense
that it gives only λ > 0):
(A) : pi′1.u
′
1 = m(1 + δg
′.E(θ))
(B) : pi′2.u
′
2 = m
(C) : u′1 = δRu
′
2
Condition (C) is the common inter-temporal arbitrage condition, saying that savings are set in
order to make the marginal rate of substitution between current and future consumption and the
gross interest rate equal. Condition (B) means that the optimal second-period harvesting rule is
reached when the marginal benefits of harvesting expressed in utility terms (pi′2u′2) are equal to
its marginal cost corresponding to the decrease in amenity services (m). Finally, condition (A)
now shows that the first-period harvesting rule makes the value of the marginal benefits in utility
terms (pi′1u′1) associated with harvesting proceeds equal to the value of its (composite) marginal cost
(m(1 + δg′.E(θ))), since harvesting more in the present period reduces the value of the first-period
amenity services, but also reduces the expected outcome of the natural growth process for the forest
between the two periods.
Rearranging (B) and (C) yields respectively u′1 =
δR
pi′2
m and u′2 =
m
pi′2
, and then substituting in
(A), we can write the system (A)-(B)-(C) as follows:
13We focus on solutions where s > 0, thus requiring that the conditions for ∂EV
∂s |s=0 > 0 are satisfied; basically,
this is the case if we introduce the restriction that R > u
′(Y1)
δu′(Y2) which is usual in savings models.
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(A′) : g′ =
1
E(θ)
.
(
R
pi′1
pi′2
− 1
δ
)
(B′) : u′2 =
m
pi′2
(C ′) : u′1 = δR
m
pi′2
These conditions call for two remarks. First, note that according to (A’), a necessary condition
required for a solution with x1 > 0 is that R
pi′1
pi′2
> 1δ . Second, given our technological assumptions
and given (2), (3), (4) and (5), we obtain a hierarchical resolution of this system: the period 1
harvesting decision is obtained thanks to condition (A’), then the optimal savings amount is given
by (C’) and, finally, condition (B’) yields the period 2 harvesting rule.
Proposition 2 summarizes our findings:
Proposition 2 In the savings model, assume that Rpi
′
1
pi′2
> 1δ ; in a pure interior solution, the period
1 harvesting rule satisfies:
g′(Q− x∗1) =
1
E(θ)
.
(
R
pi′1
pi′2
− 1
δ
)
(10)
and the period 2 harvesting rule satisfies the following condition:
u′2(Y2 +R.s
∗ + pi(x∗2)) =
m
pi′2
(11)
with a s∗ > 0 satisfying (C’).
2.3.2 Harvesting decisions in the silvicultural practice model
Second, let us assume that the higher return/cost ratio is for the forest management practice (i.e.
R− pi′2c < 0); then the NIPF owner implements this approach. Formally, the decision program of the
forest owner is now described by (P1) with s = 0, and it will be termed the “silvicultural practice
model" in the rest of the paper. The NIPF owner makes three decisions (x1, x2, q) at the beginning
of period 1 in order to maximize her/his inter-temporal satisfaction level.
In the silvicultural practice model, let us denote the optimal choice as (x∗1, x∗2, q∗)14. Once more,
using conditions (6), (7) and (9), the first order conditions for an interior solution with q > 0, x1 > 0
14Once more, we focus on solutions where q > 0, thus requiring that the conditions for ∂EV
∂q |q=0 > 0 are satisfied;
basically, this is the case if we assume that the marginal cost of silvicultural practices is low enough, such that:
c < δm
u′(Y1) . Note that more generally speaking, any model with self-protection activities usually considers such a
restriction.
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and x2 < θ.g(Q−x1)+ q (since σ = λ = γ = 0 and condition (8) is now irrelevant in the sense that
it only gives µ) are:
(H) : pi′1.u
′
1 = m(1 + δg
′.E(θ))
(I) : pi′2.u
′
2 = m
(J) : cu′1 = δm
It is obvious that the system is formally close to the one defined by (A)-(B)-(C), except with respect
to the last condition. Thus using (I) and (J) in (H), we may now substitute system (H)-(I)-(J) with:
(H ′) : g′ =
1
E(θ)
.
(pi′1
c
− 1
δ
)
(I ′) : u′2 =
m
pi′2
(J ′) : u′1 = δ
m
c
This also suggests at least that the same comments apply here regarding the resolution of the
model. First, note that a necessary condition required to have x1 > 0 is that now
pi′1
c >
1
δ . Second,
the period 1 harvesting decision is obtained directly using condition (H’) while silvicultural practices
are given by (J’) and the second-period harvesting decision is given by (I’).
Proposition 3 summarizes our findings:
Proposition 3 In the silvicultural practice model, assuming that pi
′
1
c >
1
δ ; in a pure interior solution,
then the period 1 harvesting rule satisfies:
g′(Q− x∗1) =
1
E(θ)
.
(pi′1
c
− 1
δ
)
(12)
and the period 2 harvesting rule satisfies the following condition:
u′2(Y2 + pi(x
∗
2)) =
m
pi′2
(13)
with a q > 0 given by (J’).
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2.3.3 Comparison
The comparison between the savings and silvicultural practice models yields a first consequence
which is that:
Corollary 4 The silvicultural practice model leads to a larger amount of harvesting in the second
period than the savings model, all else held equal.
Proof. Simply given that for all x2 > 0 and any s > 0 then Y2 + R.s + pi(x2) > Y2 + pi(x2);
thus by the concavity of u, we obtain u′(Y2 + R.s + pi(x2)) < u′(Y2 + pi(x2)): this implies that for
any value of x2 the Left Hand Side (LHS) in (11) is smaller than the LHS in (13). As a result,
given that both LHS are decreasing functions in x2, while in addition both RHS in (11) and (13)
are identical and constant (they do not depend on x2), then the equilibrium value for x2 is smaller
in (11) than in (13).
In contrast, note that a direct comparison of first-period harvesting decisions between the two
models does not really make sense. However, it is worth noting that there is a positive relationship
between x1 and
(Rpi′1
pi′2
− 1δ
)
in the savings model, or
(pi′1
c − 1δ
)
in the silvicultural practice one: this
leads to the intuition of the functioning of both models, which runs as follows. When R > pi
′
2
c , then
comparing (10) and (12) shows that the NIPF harvests more in the first period when he accumulates
savings than when he undertakes silvicultural practices; then, the savings enable them to transfer
a part of the first-period harvesting proceeds in the future in order to finance more consumption
in the future, although the NIPF harvests less at this date. On the contrary, when R < pi
′
2
c , the
comparison between (10) and (12) now shows that the NIPF harvests more in the first period
when she/he undertakes silvicultural practices than when she/he accumulates savings. Then, the
harvesting proceeds are used to finance silvicultural practices, which allow for more forest growth;
this gives the opportunity to harvest more in the future in order to finance more consumption at
this date.
Thus, depending on the sign of R− pi′2c , our results simply suggest that the NIPF makes decisions
which yield the most efficient strategy in terms of consumption smoothing.
Now, putting together the results of Propositions 1 to 3, we obtain a second interesting conse-
quence which is that both instruments may in fact have equivalent consequences in terms of con-
sumption smoothing. Consider two different economies, having the same characteristics in terms of
the value of δ, p1, p2 and the technological parameters such as the forest growth process g, proba-
bility distribution F (θ) and cost function h. In the first economy, forest owners have access to a
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perfect financial market paying a gross interest rate R. In the second one, forest owners have no
access to a capital market, but invest in a costly regeneration process at a marginal cost c. Then, if
the ratio of the period 2 marginal profit to the marginal cost of silvicultural practice is constant and
satisfies pi
′
2
c = R, then in both economies forest owners reach the same inter-temporal consumption
profile, choose the same harvesting rules and obtain the same value for amenity services.
An alternative way of interpreting this result may be obtained if we write R = pi
′
2
c as
p2
R =
h
R + c,
and consider that public authorities regulate the timber price market. As a result, assuming that
all NIPF have the same technology for harvesting and for silvicultural practices:
Corollary 5 Let us define as pˆ = h+R.c. Then, if the regulator sets p2 > pˆ any forest owner will
invest in silvicultural rather than in financial practice; in contrast, if the regulator sets p2 < pˆ any
forest owner will accumulate savings rather than investing in regeneration process.
We have seen before that pˆ = h + Rc is the second-period timber price market for which the
NIPF is indifferent between savings and silvicultural practice strategy. Thus, raising (lowering) p2
above (respectively, under) pˆ gives incentives to a NIPF to choose the savings strategy (respectively,
silvicultural practices).
Note that the same kind of intuition is obtained when public authorities are assumed to subsidise
the silvicultural practices, thus defining as cˆ = pi
′
2
R the marginal cost for silvicultural practices
for which the NIPF is indifferent between savings and silvicultural practice strategy. If public
authorities allocate a subsidy to NIPF such that c < cˆ, then any one will prefer silvicultural practices
to accumulating savings; but in contrast, if the subsidy is not large enough such that c > cˆ, then
any NIPF will prefer to accumulate savings rather than undertaking silvicultural practices.
3 Properties of pure interior solutions
3.1 Mitigation effects of amenity services
In this paragraph, we analyze the impact of the value of amenity services on optimal harvesting
decisions, and also on financial or physical practice.
Proposition 6 A) In the savings model, the first-period harvesting amount does not depend on
the level of amenity services; on the contrary, all else held equal, the larger the marginal utility of
amenity services, the smaller the second-period harvesting amount, but the larger the savings.
B) In the silvicultural practice model, the first-period harvesting amount does not depend on
the level of amenity services; on the contrary, all else held equal the larger the marginal utility of
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amenity services, the smaller the second-period harvesting amount, but the larger the silvicultural
practices.
Proof. A) Regarding the fact that the first-period harvesting rule does not depend on m, this
is obvious using (10). Now, given that the LHS in (11) is a decreasing function of x2 (and also of
s) and that the LHS in (C’) is increasing in s, it is easy to verify that an increase in m leads to a
decrease in x2 but an increase in s.
B) The same arguments apply for the silvicultural practice model using (12), (13) and (J) (except
that the LHS in (13) does not depend on q).
3.2 Other comparative static results
Table 1 summarizes the set of comparative static results for an interior solution. The proof of these
results is given in Appendix B for the savings model, and is available from the authors for the
physical practice model.
Table 1: Comparative static results
Financial practice silvicultural practice
x∗1 x∗2 s∗ x∗1 x∗2 q∗
Initial wealth, period 1: Y1 − − + − 0 +
Initial wealth, period 2: Y2 − − − 0 − 0
Initial forest stock: Q + − + + 0 +
Timber price, period 1: p1 +a − + +a 0 +
Timber price, period 2: p2 − +a − 0 +a 0
Rate of return on savings: R +a − +a
Cost of regeneration process: c +a 0 −
Expected risk : E(θ) − + − − 0 −
a These results are obtained if the partial risk aversion coefficient is less than 1 otherwise ambiguous results emerge.
A major difference appears between the two instruments. The comparative static results for the
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silvicultural practice model show a lot of zero values, i.e. several parameters have no effect on the
decision variables (x1, x2 or q), as compared to the savings model. This difference is due to our
assumption concerning the utility afforded by amenity services. Indeed, the savings decision acts on
the utility of second-period consumption, assuming as usual a decreasing marginal utility u′′ < 0.
In contrast, the silvicultural practices (regeneration process) act on the utility of future amenity
services, which is supposed to satisfy the constant marginal utility assumption: v′(.) = m > 0 and
v′′ = 0. We will relax this assumption later on.
• Income and stock effects
Our results concerning the impact of an increase in first-period income Y1 and initial forest stock
Q on decisions about protection instruments are traditional. We find positive income/stock effects
for s and q. This result means that savings and regeneration process are superior goods. Concerning
an increase in Y2, the effect on the accumulation of savings s is negative, due to the fact that the
forest owner anticipating an increase in her/his second-period income decides to reduce savings in
period 1 in order to keep the consumption level constant in period 2.
• Price effects
An increase in the wood price in the first period leads to an increase in the first-period harvesting
and in the use of savings and the regeneration process as a means of protecting against natural
disasters. We observe positive price effects on savings and the regeneration process. The impact
of an increase in first-period prices on first-period harvest can be broken down into two effects: a
negative income effect
(
dx1
dY1
< 0
)
and a positive substitution one. The use of the partial risk aversion
coefficient allows us to assert that, if this coefficient is smaller than 1, then the substitution effect
is greater than the income one, so the forest owner increases first-period harvesting to be wealthier.
The higher level of income allows the owner to reduce second-period harvesting, while keeping
her/his second-period consumption constant, as we observed for savings. An increase in first-period
price gives the owners incentives to adopt savings or the regeneration process. Consequently, the
implementation of minimum prices for wood products may guarantee the owners that the wood
prices will not fall below this threshold. This artificial support may prevent prices from collapsing.
An increase in the wood price in the second period reduces the first-period harvesting and the
recourse to financial practice for the savings model, while these two effects are null for the silvicul-
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tural practice model. The impact of an increase in second-period price on second-period harvesting
is positive for savings and the regeneration process. We have a negative income effect
(
dx2
dY2
< 0
)
and a positive substitution one. If the partial risk aversion coefficient is less than 1, then the sub-
stitution effect dominates the income effect, so owners increase second-period harvesting.
• Opportunity cost effects
Table 1 shows that the impact of an increase in the rate of return on savings is positive on first-
period harvesting and the accumulation of savings, while this effect is negative on second-period
harvesting. Although these two effects are opposite (negative income effect and positive substitution
one), if the partial risk aversion coefficient is less than 1, we can report that when forest revenue
rises, owners increase first-period harvest in order to be wealthier.
The effect of an increase in the cost of the regeneration process on first-period harvesting is
positive if the partial risk aversion coefficient is less than 1, null on the second-period harvest and
finally, negative on the use of the silvicultural practice. As the cost rises, the owners reduce the
stock of regenerated trees, because it becomes more and more expensive for them to regenerate a
part of the forest.
• Risk effect
Given that the objective function in (P1) is linear in θ, any increase in the risk affecting the
probability density function of θ, either in the first stochastic dominance or second stochastic dom-
inance sense, simply yields a decrease in E(θ). Consequently, we conduct our static comparative
analysis of a shift in risk focusing directly on an increase in E(θ).
We observe that an increase in E(θ) reduces first-period harvest and the recourse to savings
or regeneration. We also remark that an increase in E(θ) generates an increase in second-period
harvesting. The information about θ was revealed at the beginning of second period, so when the
owners learn that E(θ) is higher, they increase second-period harvesting in order to reduce the
potential losses in case of disaster.
To conclude, except for the null effects of comparative statics results for the regeneration process,
all the others results are identical for the two instruments. These results confirm Proposition 1
according to which, savings and regeneration process could be substitutes.
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4 Corner solutions and extensions
4.1 Harvesting rules with binding constraints in the second period
This paragraph deals explicitly with cases where the feasibility constraint for second-period har-
vesting rules binds. Such a constraint plays the role of a self-restraint mechanism or precautionary
behavior which commits the NIPF not to harvest more than the worst (smallest) existing stock of
timber that should arise at the beginning of period 2 (i.e. in cases where the realized forest growth
is lowest).
In the savings model according to conditions (6), (7) and (8), the first order conditions for a
(corner) solution with s > 0, x1 > 0 but x2 = θ.g(Q− x1) are given by the next three equations:
(D) : pi′1.u
′
1 = m(1 + δg
′E(θ)) + γθg′
(E) : pi′2.u
′
2 −m =
γ
δ
(G) : u′1 = δRu
′
2
since µ = σ = 0 but γ > 0 as the associated feasibility constraint binds (and condition (9) is still
irrelevant).
More specifically, remark that condition (E) implies pi′2.u′2 > m at x∗2 = θ.g(k∗1) meaning that the
owner’s satisfaction level (inter-temporal expected utility) increases at x∗2 = θ.g(k∗1). As a conse-
quence, when the (self-restraint) constraint on second-period harvesting is relaxed (or if we assume
it totally vanishes), the owner will enjoy the opportunity to increase the second-period harvesting
a little further, since this will make them better off. In a sense, condition (B) suggests that the
smaller the value of the marginal utility of amenity services (m), the easier or the more likely it is
that this corner solution will occur.
In the silvicultural practice model, the corner solution with q > 0, x1 > 0 and x2 = θ.g(Q−x1)+q
is associated with the next three conditions:
(K) : pi′1.u
′
1 = m(1 + δg
′E(θ)) + γθ.g′
(L) : pi′2.u
′
2 = m+
γ
δ
(M) : cu′1 = δm+ γ
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where λ > 0, since σ = 0, λ = 0, but γ > 0 (and condition (8) is still irrelevant).
The next Proposition 7 and Corollary 8 summarize our findings. First, focusing on first-period
harvesting rules, we have shown that:
Proposition 7 A) In the savings model, assuming that Rpi
′
1
pi′2
> 1δ , then in a solution with x2 =
θ.g(k1), the period 1 harvesting rule satisfies:
g′(Q− x∗1) =
[(pi′2u′2
m
)
.R
pi′1
pi′2
− 1
δ
]
×
[((pi′2u′2
m
)
− 1
)
θ + E(θ)
]−1
(14)
knowing that s∗ is given by condition (G).
B) In the silvicultural practice model, assuming that pi
′
1
c >
1
δ , then in a solution with x2 =
θ.g(k1) + q, the period 1 harvesting rule satisfies:
g′(Q− x∗1) =
[(pi′2u′2
m
)
.
pi′1
c
− 1
δ
]
×
[((pi′2u′2
m
)
− 1
)
θ + E(θ)
]−1
(15)
knowing that q∗ is given by condition (M).
Proof. A) In the savings model:
Let us substitute (E) in (D) to eliminate γ > 0, then use (G) and rearrange to obtain:
(D′) : g′ =
[(pi′2u′2
m
)
.R
pi′1
pi′2
− 1
δ
]
×
[((pi′2u′2
m
)− 1
)
θ + E(θ
)]−1
Note that according to (E) we obtain pi
′
2u
′
2
m > 1, and thus R
pi′1
pi′2
> 1δ is still a sufficient (stronger
than needed) condition for having a x1 > 0 satisfying condition (D’). Finally, solving (D’)-(G) gives
the first-period harvesting rule and the optimal level of saving, while the value for γ results from
condition (E).
B) In the silvicultural model:
Using (L) and (M) we obtain u′1 = δ
pi′2
c .u
′
2, then substituting in (K) yields:
(K ′) : g′ =
[(pi′2u′2
m
)
.
pi′1
c
− 1
δ
]
×
[((pi′2u′2
m
)
− 1
)
θ +E(θ)
]−1
Once more, given that according to (L) we have pi
′
2u
′
2
m > 1, then
pi′1
c >
1
δ is still a sufficient
21
(stronger than needed) condition to have x1 > 0 satisfying (K’). Solving now simultaneously (K’)-
(L)-(M) gives the optimal harvesting rule for the first period, the optimal silvicultural practice and
γ.
Moreover, we obtain the next result:
Corollary 8 A) In both the savings and silvicultural practice models, the first-period harvesting
amount is larger when the feasibility constraint on second-period harvesting binds than when it does
not.
B) In the savings model, the savings accumulated are larger when the feasibility constraint on
second-period harvesting binds than when it does not.
C) In the physical model, the level of physical practices undertaken is larger when the feasibility
constraint on second-period harvesting binds than when it does not.
Proof. A) Let us give the explicit argument for the savings model. It amounts to comparing
the RHS in (14) and (10). Under the condition Rpi
′
1
pi′2
> 1δ , it can be verified that the next inequality:
1
E(θ)
.
(
R
pi′1
pi′2
− 1
δ
)
<
[(pi′2u′2
m
)
.R
pi′1
pi′2
− 1
δ
]
×
[((pi′2u′2
m
)
− 1
)
θ +E(θ)
]−1
is equivalent to:
−θ
δ
< (E(θ)− θ)Rpi
′
1
pi′2
once the condition has been simplified in order to remove the term pi
′
2u
′
2
m − 1 > 0 from both sides.
But this last inequality is still true since E(θ) > θ. As a result, given that the LHS in both (10)
and (14) is an increasing function of x1, the equilibrium value for x1 satisfying (10) is smaller than
the one satisfying (14).
B) Simply, since mixing (E) and (G) yields u′1 =
δR
pi′2
(
m+ γδ
)
> δR
pi′2
m; thus comparing with (C’),
the value of s which satisfies (G) is larger than the one satisfying (C’).
C) A similar argument may be used for q; this is left to the reader.
Corollary 8 implies that, should the NIPF impose a self-restraint constraint on his second-period
harvesting rule of his own choice, then this leads him to compensate with a higher level of cutting
in the first period. At the same time, the available instrument (savings or silvicultural practices)
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is increased to a higher level since it is used to transfer the additional harvesting income to the
second period, in order to allow for the smoothing of consumption. This shows that the choice of a
harvesting strategy and hedging strategy is designed to reach the best smoothing of consumption
flows between both periods.
4.2 Concave amenity services
In this paragraph, we assess the impact of the shape of the utility derived from amenity services,
assuming a concave utility function. Comparing our results to the previous case with a constant
marginal utility allows us to enhance the role of different NIPF owner preferences. In order to
remove redundancies, we will focus only on the interior solution in the savings model, but the same
analysis may be performed in the silvicultural practice model, and/or when the feasibility constraint
binds.
To begin with, note that the results displayed in Proposition 6 are true whether or not the future
value of amenities is known with certainty: given the (positive) terminal value corresponding to the
utility of amenity services, the forest owner voluntarily limits harvesting in both periods. But as
m → 0, the owner behaves more and more closely to a profit-maximizing individual. In contrast,
considering the case where the forest owner has a concave utility for amenity services means that
the forest owner is averse to the uncertainty associated with the value of future stands, since she/he
does not like spreading the shock θ in
[
θ, θ¯
]
.
Proposition 9 In the savings model, all else held equal, the harvesting rules for both periods (in a
pure interior solution with x2 < θ.g(k1)) may lead to a higher level of cutting with a concave utility
for amenity services, as compared to the linear case. But the opposite result may also hold.
Proof. Assume that v the utility function for amenity services is concave. Relaxing the assump-
tion of a constant marginal utility for amenity services yields the following first order conditions in
the savings model:
(N) : pi′1.u
′
1 = v
′
1 + δg
′.E(θ.v′2)
(O) : pi′2.u
′
2 = E(v
′
2)
(P ) : u′1 = δRu
′
2
which substitutes with the system (A)-(B)-(C). Note that using (O) and (P) in (N) yields:
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R
pi′1
pi′2
− 1
δ
v′1
Ev′2
= g′.
E(θ.v′2)
Ev′2
> 0
⇓
R
pi′1
pi′2
− 1
δ
v′1
Ev′2
= g′.
[
E(θ) +
cov(θ, v′2)
E(v′2)
]
where cov(θ, v′2) < 0. But the concavity of the amenity services modifies the psychological costs (or
opportunity costs) of harvesting as compared to the linear case in several ways.
On the one hand, it reduces the owner’s individual assessment of the risk-adjusted marginal
product of the forest growth process since g′.
[
E(θ) + cov(θ,v
′
2)
E(v′2)
]
< g′.E(θ): given the concavity of v,
the dispersion of shock θ is seen as a cost (the price of risk) which affects her/his perception of the
natural productivity for the growth process; as a result, this first effect has a negative impact on
the period 1 harvesting decision.
On the other hand, a non-linear utility for amenity services modifies the tradeoff between amenity
services in period 1 and those of period 2, through the ratio E(v
′
2)
v′1
≷ 1. However, these effects are
ambiguous. Thus, the specific result depends in particular on the characteristics of the risk, and on
the properties of function v.
At the same time, according to condition (O), the result for x2 depends on whether m ≶ E(v′2).
Once more, this requires more restriction on function v and on the probability distribution of σ.
4.3 Delayed versus early resolution of uncertainty
Let us assume once more that v′ = m, but introduce another representation of uncertainty, named
early resolution of uncertainty, which is associated with the random variable σ, the value of which
is resolved at the beginning of the growth process, as illustrated in Figure 2.
This means that σ is now revealed and observed by the forest owner at the end of period
1 (at the beginning of the interim period), and thus before the realization of the second-period
harvesting decision, such that the value of the stand at the end of the growth process and before
that harvesting takes place is g(σk1). The possible realizations for σ are described according to
a probability distribution which is assumed to be known by the forest owner at the beginning of
period 1, and represented by a cumulative function denoted L(σ) defined on [σ, σ¯] ⊂ [0, 1] and with
a density l(σ) > 0 everywhere. Remark once more that we may choose σ as close as possible to
0, which may be seen as the realization of a catastrophic event implying that the forest is fully
destroyed. In this case, any harvesting decision x2 > 0 set in period 1 appears not to be feasible. In
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Figure 2: Early resolution of uncertainty
contrast, as σ → 1, the event corresponds to the best outcome for the NIPF owner, when no natural
risk damages the forest property. Note that we develop the analysis explicitly in the savings model;
however, it can be verified that the same kind of results are obtained in the silvicultural practice
model.
The optimal first-period harvesting rule for the financial practice model is defined as follows:
i) If x2 < θ.g(k1), then the optimal first-period harvesting decision satisfies:
R
pi′1
pi′2
− 1
δ
= E(σ.g′(σ.k∗1)) (16)
ii) if x2 = θ.g(k1), then the optimal first-period harvesting rule satisfies:
(pi′2u′2
m
)
.R
pi′1
pi′2
− 1
δ
=
((pi′2u′2
m
)
− 1
)
g′(σ.k∗1).σ +E(σ.g
′(σ.k∗1)) (17)
while the first order conditions for the optimal second-period harvesting and savings decisions are
identical. We prove the next result:
Proposition 10 In the savings model, whether x2 < θ.g(k1) or x2 = θ.g(k1) holds, then, all else
held equal, the period 1 harvesting rule leads to a higher level of cutting with the delayed resolution
of uncertainty than with the early resolution of uncertainty.
Proof. The result holds whatever the model, since for any two random variables X,Z, we have
by definition E(X.Z) = E(X).E(Z)+ cov(X,Z). Thus, let us consider for example the model with
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savings, and its solution when the feasibility constraint does not bind. Assume more particularly
that the probability distribution of both θ and σ have the same mean E(θ) = E(σ). Using the
RHS of condition (16), we may write: E(σ.g′(k∗1)) = E(σ).E(g′(σ.k∗1))+ cov(σ, g′(σ.k∗1)) > 0. Given
the concavity of g, as σ increases then g′(σ.k∗1) decreases, implying that cov(σ, g′(σ.k∗1)) < 0. As a
result:
R
pi′1
pi′2
− 1
δ
= E(σ.g′(σ.k∗1))
= E(σ).E(g′(σ.k∗1)) + cov(σ, g
′(σ.k∗1))
< E(σ).E(g′(σ.k∗1))
and under the assumption that E(θ) = E(σ), then the LHS in (10) is larger than the one in (16),
yielding a larger amount for period 1 harvesting with delayed resolution of uncertainty.
Coming back to the previous analysis of the amenity effect, the intuition of the result is that
the psychological costs associated with the early resolution of uncertainty are larger with delayed
resolution of uncertainty than with an early one.
5 Conclusion
Some empirical studies suggest that NIPF owners produce timber income and non-timber benefits
jointly. Utility-maximization recognizes that forest owners may gain non-pecuniary benefits such
as aesthetics, recreation and wildlife habitat from the forest stands on their land, in addition to
the value of timber. In many cases, landowners still appear to have an interest in producing both
timber income and forest amenities jointly. The substitution between harvesting and non-timber
preferences has been of particular interest. In this article, we develop a dynamic theoretical model
to analyze the NIPF owner’s behavior in risky forest management. We study two hedging activi-
ties that the forest owner can undertake to protect the forest against natural hazards: the savings
and the regeneration processes. In this work, there are several contributions. First, we extend the
two-period biomass harvesting model by integrating the hedging strategies. In this framework, we
demonstrate that under some assumptions, the accumulation of savings and the regeneration process
may be seen as perfectly substitutable for forest owners. Second, we analyze the impact of amenity
services on optimal harvesting decisions. Third, we develop the comparative statics of harvesting
strategies by studying the effect of each parameter and uncertainty on the optimal decisions. For
example, we show that, when the expected risk increases, the owner reduces first-period harvesting
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and the use of hedging strategies (whatever the measure) while she/he increases second-period har-
vesting in the savings model and has a null effect in the silvicultural practice one.
Several extensions are worth discussing for this research. First, our assumption of a constant
marginal utility for amenity services could be seen as a limit of this paper, but this assumption
makes the analysis much more transparent. We can easily generalize our analysis assuming that
the marginal utility is not constant, but we know that we can expect to obtain ambiguous results
of comparative statics. This extension is analyzed in the paper by considering a concave marginal
utility for amenities.
Our results cannot be challenged without introducing some frictions or imperfections in the model.
For example, the basic two-period model we use implies that both financial (savings) and silvi-
cultural (regeneration process) practice are held for the same (short-term) horizon. However, due
to imperfections in the financial markets on the one hand (asymmetrical information, borrowing
constraints, different interest rates for lenders and borrowers), and on the other hand, given the
existence of a natural delay between the plantation of the trees and their harvesting, the horizon
of decisions in financial markets may be shorter than for decisions connected to the regeneration
process. Moreover, the production process in forestry may be more or less lengthy, depending on
the choice of tree species.
In the same way, another extension consists in the possibility for the forest owners of learning the
state of the world (gathering information on the weather, and thus on θ). We can expect that
when information has a positive value, it will be used by forest owners in order to plan both their
harvesting decisions and their risk management ones. These important extensions are left for future
research.
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A Second order conditions
Consider the savings model. The matrix of the second order derivatives is:
∆ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Vx1x1 Vx1x2 Vx1s
Vx2x1s Vx2x2s Vx2s
Vsx1 δVsx2 Vss
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Vx1x1 0 Vx1s
0 Vx2x2 Vx2s
Vsx1 δVsx2 Vss
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(pi′1)
2 u′′(c1) +mδE(θ)g′′(k1) 0 −pi′1u′′(c1)
0 (pi′2)
2 u′′(c2) Rpi′2u′′(c2)
−pi′1u′′(c1) δRpi′2u′′(c2) u′′(c1) + δR2u′′(c2)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
29
The second order conditions are verified if the minors alternate in signs:
Vx1x1 < 0∣∣∣∣∣∣ Vx1x1 Vx1x2Vx2x1 Vx2x2
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > 0∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Vx1x1 Vx1x2 Vx1s
Vx2x1 Vx2x2 Vx2s
Vsx1 δVsx2 Vss
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ < 0
It is easy to verify that the restrictions on u, and g (u′′ < 0, g′′ < 0) are sufficient.
B Comparative statics results
Consider the savings model with an interior solution. Given that ∆ < 0 (Appendix A), we have:
1/ A change in period 1 exogenous income: Y1
dx1
dY1
=
1
∆
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−pi′1.u′′1 0 Vx1s
0 Vx2x2 Vx2s
u′′1 δVsx2 Vss
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ < 0
dx2
dY1
=
1
∆
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Vx1x1 −pi′1.u′′1 Vx1s
0 0 Vx2s
Vsx1 u
′′
1 Vss
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ < 0
ds
dY1
=
1
∆
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Vx1x1 0 −pi′1.u′′1
0 Vx2x2 0
Vsx1 δVsx2 u
′′
1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ > 0
2/ A change in period 2 exogenous income: Y2
dx1
dY2
=
1
∆
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 Vx1s
−pi′2.u′′2 Vx2x2 Vx2s
−δRu′′2 δVsx2 Vss
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ < 0
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dx2
dY2
=
1
∆
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Vx1x1s 0 Vx1s
0 −pi′2.u′′2 Vx2s
Vsx1 −δRu′′2 Vss
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ < 0
ds
dY2
=
1
∆
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Vx1x1s 0 0
0 Vx2x2 −pi′2.u′′2
Vsx1 δVsx2 −δRu′′2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ < 0
3/ A change in initial forest stock: Q
dx1
dQ
=
1
∆
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
δmg′′(k1)E(θ) 0 Vx1s
0 Vx2x2 Vx2s
0 δVsx2 Vss
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ > 0
dx2
dQ
=
1
∆
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Vx1x1s δmg
′′(k1)E(θ) Vx1s
0 0 Vx2s
Vsx1 0 Vss
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ < 0
ds
dQ
=
1
∆
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Vx1x1s 0 δmg
′′(k1)E(θ)
0 Vx2x2 0
Vsx1 δVsx2 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ > 0
4/ A change in period 1 harvesting price: p1
dx1
dp1
=
1
∆
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−u′1 − pi′1.u′′1.x1 0 Vx1s
0 Vx2x2 Vx2s
u′′1.x1 δVsx2 Vss
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
−δu′1
∆
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Vx2x2 Vx2sVsx2 Vss
∣∣∣∣∣∣+ dx1dY1 .x1
The sign of dx1dp1 is ambiguous because we have a negative income effect associated with a positive
substitution effect. Nevertheless, if we turn to the partial risk aversion coefficient, we find that x1
increases when p1 rises.
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Indeed, the last expression can be rewritten as follows:
dx1
dp1
=
1
∆
{
pi′′(x2)u′(c2)δR2u′′(c2)[−u′(c1)− pi′(x1)u′′(c1)x1]− u′(c1)u′′(c1)Vx2x2
}
The term [−u′(c1)− pi′(x1)u′′(c1)x1] is ambiguous and can be rewritten as follows:
u′(c1)
[
−1 +
(
−u
′′(c1)
u′(c1)
pi′(x1)x1
)]
This last expression allows us to observe a partial risk aversion coefficient: −u′′(c1)u′(c1) pi′(x1)x1. If
this coefficient is less than 1, then dx1dp1 > 0. The substitution effect is stronger than the income
effect.
dx2
dp1
=
1
∆
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Vx1x1 −u′1 − pi′1.u′′1.x1 Vx1s
0 0 Vx2s
Vsx1 u
′′
1.x1 Vss
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
−u′1
∆
Vx2s.Vsx1 +
dx2
dY1
.x1 < 0
ds
dp1
=
1
∆
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Vx1x1 0 −u′1 − pi′1.u′′1.x1
0 Vx2x2 0
Vsx1 δVsx2 u
′′
1.x1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
−u′1
∆
Vx2x2 .Vsx1 +
ds
dY1
.x1 > 0
4/ A change in period 2 harvesting price: p2
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dx1
dp2
=
1
∆
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 Vx1s
−u′2 − pi′2.u′′2.x2 Vx2x2 Vx2s
δRu′′2.x2 δVsx2 Vss
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
−u′2
∆
Vx1s.Vx2s +
dx1
dY2
.x2 < 0
dx2
dp2
=
1
∆
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Vx1x1 0 Vx1s
0 −u′2 − pi′2.u′′2.x2 Vx2s
Vsx1 δRu
′′
2.x2 Vss
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
−u′2
∆
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Vx1x1 Vx1sVsx1 Vss
∣∣∣∣∣∣+ dx2dY2 .x2
The sign of dx2dp2 is ambiguous because we have a negative income effect associated with a positive
substitution effect. Nevertheless, if we turn to the partial risk aversion coefficient, we find that x2
increases when p2 rises.
Indeed, the last expression can be rewritten as follows:
dx2
dp2
=
1
∆
{
u′′(c1)[pi′′(x1)u′(c1) + δmθg′′(k1)][−u′(c2)− pi′(x2)u′′(c2)x2]
}
The term [−u′(c2)− pi′(x2)u′′(c2)x2] is ambiguous and can be rewritten as follows:
u′(c2)
[
−1 +
(
−u
′′(c2)
u′(c2)
pi′(x2)x2
)]
This last expression allows us to observe a partial risk aversion coefficient: −u′′(c2)u′(c2) pi′(x2)x2. If
this coefficient is less than to 1, then dx2dp2 > 0. The substitution effect is stronger than the income
effect.
ds
dp2
=
1
∆
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Vx1x1 0 0
0 Vx2x2 −u′2 − pi′2.u′′2.x2
Vsx1 δVsx2 δRu
′′
2.x2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
u′2
∆
Vx1x1 .δVsx2 +
ds
dY2
.x2 < 0
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5/ A change in rate of return: R
dx1
dR
=
1
∆
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 Vx1s
−pi′2.u′′2.s Vx2x2 Vx2s
−δRu′′2.s− δu′2 δVsx2 Vss
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
δu′2
∆
Vx1s.Vx2x2 +
dx1
dY2
.s
The sign of dx1dR is ambiguous because we have a negative income effect associated with another
effect which is positive. Nevertheless, if we turn to the partial risk aversion coefficient, we find that
x1 increases when R rises.
Indeed, the last expression can be rewritten as follows:
dx1
dR
=
1
∆
{
pi′′(x2)u′(c2)pi′(x1)u′′(c1)[−δu′(c2)− δRu′′(c2)s]− δu′(c2)pi′(x1)u′′(c1)(pi′(x2))2u′′(c2)
}
The term [−δu′(c2)− δRu′′(c2)s] is ambiguous and can be rewritten as follows:
δu′(c2)
[
−1 +
(
−u
′′(c2)
u′(c2)
Rs
)]
This last expression allows us to observe a partial risk aversion coefficient: −u′′(c2)u′(c2)Rs. If this
coefficient is less than 1, then dx1dR > 0. The positive effect is stronger than the income effect.
dx2
dR
=
1
∆
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Vx1x1 0 Vx1s
0 −pi′2.u′′2.s Vx2s
Vsx1 −δRu′′2.s− δu′2 Vss
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
δu′2
∆
Vx1x1 .Vx2s +
dx2
dY2
.s < 0
ds
dR
=
1
∆
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Vx1x1 0 0
0 Vx2x2 −pi′2.u′′2.s
Vsx1 δVsx2 −δRu′′2.s− δu′2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
−δu′2
∆
Vx1x1 .Vx2x2 +
ds
dY2
.s
The sign of dsdR is ambiguous because we have a negative income effect associated with an another
effect which is positive.
Nevertheless, if we turn to the partial risk aversion coefficient, we find that s increases when R rises.
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Indeed, the last expression can be rewritten as follows:
ds
dR
=
1
∆
{
Vx1x1 + δpi
′′(x2)u′(c2)[−u′(c2)−Ru′′(c2)s]
}
The term [−u′(c2)−Ru′′(c2)s] is ambiguous and can be rewritten as follows:
δu′(c2)
[
−1 +
(
−u
′′(c2)
u′(c2)
Rs
)]
This last expression allows us to observe a partial risk aversion coefficient: −u′′(c2)u′(c2)Rs. If this
coefficient is less than 1, then dsdR > 0. The positive effect is stronger than the income effect.
6/ A change in expected growth: E(θ)
dx1
dE(θ)
=
1
∆
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
δmg′(k1) 0 Vx1s
0 Vx2x2 Vx2s
0 δVsx2 Vss
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ < 0
dx2
dE(θ)
=
1
∆
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Vx1x1 δmg
′(k1) Vx1s
0 0 Vx2s
Vsx1 0 Vss
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ > 0
ds
dE(θ)
=
1
∆
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Vx1x1 0 δmg
′(k1)
0 Vx2x2 0
Vsx1 δVsx2 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ < 0
35
